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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2004, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
issued an advisory opinion declaring that the security barrier' Israel
began constructing in late 2002 violates international law. 2 The negative
reaction to the Barrier Opinion has been substantial. Criticisms have
been leveled at, among other things, the Court's propriety in deciding the
case on the merits,3 its conclusion that the United Nations Charter's
* Law Clerk, Judge Stanley Marcus, United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, 2006-07; Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2006; Johns
Hopkins University, B.S. 1998. The author wishes to thank Professor Joost
Pauwelyn for his insightful comments and criticisms.
'Although this article uses the more neutral terms "barrier" or "security barrier,"
the term used to describe the system of fences, ditches, sensors, and walls that
Israel has constructed has itself become highly politicized. See infra. Note 56.
Supporters prefer the term "security fence" while detractors use terms such as
"wall," "separation wall," or even "conquest wall." See, e.g., Letter Dated 1
October 2003 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/58/399 (2003) (repeatedly using the term "conquest wall"). This letter was
included in the Secretary General's submissions to the Court and is discussed
below in Part III.
2 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009 (July 9) [hereinafter "Barrier
Opinion"].
3 Michla Pomerance, The ICJ's Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall
Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (2005).
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self-defense provisions are inapplicable, 4 its factual findings with respect
to Israeli security and Palestinian terrorism, 5 and its cursory treatment of
international humanitarian law. 6 Even those who consider the Court's
decision correct have expressed concern that the opinion supporting the
decision is "not legally well-founded." 7
The International Court of Justice was created in the aftermath of
World War II with the hope that it would provide countries with an
effective forum to settle their differences so that they would not resort to
military measures. As the judicial organ of the United Nations, the ICJ
was intended to function as a "Supreme Court of the Nations."8 For
several reasons this moniker is inapt. The ICJ is not supreme above
nations: countries need not consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction, and
occasionally countries that have agreed ex ante to the ICJ's jurisdiction
have subsequently refused to comply with an adverse decision. 9 Nor is
the ICJ supreme above other courts; the ICJ is simultaneously a court of
first instance and a court of last resort. There are no courts below it that
are bound by its rulings on matters of law, nor are there courts above it
that are limited to the ICJ's findings of fact in a particular case.
This latter point-that the ICJ is a single court operating alone,
rather than a full-fledged judicial system with a hierarchy of courts-
4 Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse
Dixitfrom the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005).
5 Geoffrey R. Watson, The "Wall" Decisions in Legal and Political Context, 99
AM. J. INT'L L. 6, 25 (2005); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJAdvisory Opinion on the
Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 52
(2005).
6 See generally David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of
International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (2005).
7 These views are discussed below in Part III.
8 This term is borrowed from MICHLA POMERANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND
THE WORLD COURT AS A "SUPREME COURT OF THE NATIONS:" DREAMS,
ILLUSIONS AND DISILLUSION (Kluwer Law International) (1996).
9 See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1, 38-42 (2005) (describing examples of
noncompliance with the ICJ by Albania, France Iceland, India, Iran, Serbia, and
the United States); Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in
Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1229, 1310 (2004) (noting instances of noncompliance with the
ICJ).
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helps explain the shortcomings of the ICJ in exercising its advisory
function. The entire judicial organ of the United Nations is a single court
that is institutionally close to the legislative organ, the often highly-
politicized General Assembly. The lack of separation between the
judicial and legislative organs is especially apparent when an advisory
opinion is requested by the General Assembly itself, as was the case with
the Barrier Opinion. Accordingly, the Barrier Opinion is an apt example
of the deficiencies inherent in the ICJ's advisory function, not only
because it is the most recent advisory opinion issued by the ICJ, but also
because it combines "the most objectionable features of previous abuse
of the advisory function" in a single case. l°
I. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
Alexander Hamilton called the judicial branch of the United
States government the "least dangerous" branch because federal courts
are unable to enforce their own decisions." Rather, the judiciary must
rely on the executive to carry out its orders, and in the unlikely event that
the President chose not to enforce a court's decision, there is little the
court could do about it. 12 Casual observers of the interaction between the
three branches of government assume the judiciary has "the last word"
on a given legal issue; in reality, "it is the executive that effectively has
the last word on most controversies through its power to execute or
decline to execute ...judgments."' 3 The idea that courts could be
ignored was probably of more concern to judges 200 years ago than
10 Pomerance, supra note 3, at 31.
" THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton also considered the
judiciary to be "the weakest of the three departments of power" because it can
never "attack," that is, it can only exercise power in response to a case
voluntarily brought before it, whereas the legislature and the executive can
exercise their power without regard to the independent actions of others. Id.
12 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. J. 217, 223 (1994).
13 id.
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today,' 4 but the Supreme Court still recognizes that it ultimately depends
on the executive branch for enforcement of its orders.
15
The realization that the executive can simply ignore court
decisions is quite startling. However, it has virtually never done so1
6
because there exists a powerful non-legal check on the executive. 7 The
public outcry and the resulting legislative response would be too painful
politically, so the argument goes, if the President simply chose to ignore
a court order.' 8 So while the President may be legally free to ignore the
courts, such a course of action would be politically unwise. However,
the virtual certainty of a severe adverse political reaction begs the
question: why do federal courts enjoy such political support? After all,
the federal judiciary is often unpopular.' 9  The recently ascendant
'4 In the first few decades after the ratification of the Constitution of the United
States, the possibility that the executive branch might not comply with a
Supreme Court ruling weighed on the Justices' minds, especially in politically
charged cases. For example, when deciding the landmark Marbury v. Madison
decision, Chief Justice Marshall was well-aware that the Republican President
Thomas Jefferson would likely ignore an order in favor of the
Federalist-appointed Marbury. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
40-41 (2002). Nearly thirty years later, President Andrew Jackson refused to
use federal troops to enforce the Court's order in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (invalidating a Georgia state criminal conviction). In
response to that decision, Jackson is purported to have said, "Well, John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." Louis Fisher, Indian
Religious Freedom: To Litigate or Legislate?, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5
(2001). Perhaps the most well-known instance of executive noncompliance
occurred during the Civil War, when President Lincoln completely ignored a
writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman, 17
F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861), although for a variety of reasons, there was little
public outcry over Lincoln's actions. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS
BUT ONE 44-45 (1998).
'5 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (observing
that the Court "cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees").
16 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14.
17 Paulsen, supra note 12, at 301.
18 Id. at 302.
'9 For example, after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Kelo v.
New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), allowing the use of eminent domain to
take the homes of several long-time residents for an economic revitalization
plan, some suggested that the same method of property acquisition be turned
[Vol. 14:2
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rallying cry that "activist judges" are an evil to be eradicated indicates
that there are sizeable constituencies that might support a President who
would eviscerate federal judges' power.20  The Supreme Court dealt
severe blows to several of the current administration's policies,2 ' yet it is
doubtful that the President ever seriously considers ignoring rulings of
either the Supreme Court or lower courts. Rather, non-compliance with
domestic courts is viewed as a nonviable strategy22 in part because
federal courts have generally taken care to issue legally well-founded
judgments and to refrain from deciding disputes that are inappropriate for
judicial resolution.23
An institution can be said to be legitimate if there exists "the
belief in the binding nature of an institution's decisions, even when one
disagrees with them.",24 Federal judges are vigilant about preserving the
against the justices. See Benjamin Weyl, Activist Tries a Grab for Jurist's
Property, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at A 10 (describing an activist's apparently
serious suggestion that the city of Weare, New Hampshire use eminent domain
to acquire Justice Souter's vacation home in order to build a new hotel).
20 Ruth Marcus, Editorial, Booting the Bench: There's New Ferocity in Talk of
Firing Activist Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2005, at A19; see also, e.g., Steve
King, Letter to the Editor, Activist Judges Need to be Shown Door, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Apr. 27, 2005, at A04 ("[The judiciary] needs to read the U.S.
Constitution, and put away the Communist Manifesto, because Karl Marx was
not one of our Founding Fathers."); Debbie Salituro, Letter to the Editor,
Activist Judge Who Ignored Voters' Will Should Be Removed, STATESMAN J.
(Salem, Or.), Oct. 19, 2005, at 4C ("This ... voter is sick and tired of activist
judges pushing forward the agendas of small, boisterous special-interest
groups.").
21 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (8-1 plurality decision
against the Bush administration's contention that it could detain citizens
captured as "enemy combatants" indefinitely without charge).
22 Non-compliance with the ICJ, however, has been viewed as a viable strategy
by a not insignificant handful of countries, including the United States. Posner &
Yoo, supra note 9, at 38-41; Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 9, at 1310.
23 E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (declining to reach the
merits of the case because the issues raised were more suited to resolution by the
political branches).
24 John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775,
777 (2001). I am only concerned here with what Yoo calls a "sociological"
definition of legitimacy, because the issue for the ICJ is "whether people [and
2006]
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judiciary's political capital because they realize that it exists only so long
as the judicial branch is perceived as legitimate . As Justice O'Connor
stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,26 "the Court's legitimacy
depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in
which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted
by the Nation., 27 Despite almost two centuries of a nearly perfect record
of executive compliance with the decisions of federal courts, Justice
O'Connor's observation highlights the Supreme Court's continued
recognition that the preservation of its power may be easily undermined
by unprincipled decisions.28
The ICJ would do well to note that the United States Supreme
Court-arguably the world's most powerful court-takes such care to
maintain its legitimacy. 29 Like domestic courts, the ICJ has "neither
force nor will, but merely judgment." 30  Domestically, however, the
entire apparatus of the executive branch, with its police forces and
regulatory agencies, stands ready to enforce court orders. The federal
judiciary of the United States has built up a deep reservoir of authority
capable of carrying it through an occasional crisis of legitimacy
hence nations] will think the Court's decision[s are] . . . legitimate, and as a
result will obey [them]." Id. Others have called this "political capital." See,
e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics,
110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1450 (2000) ("One element of political capital might be the
likelihood that people will follow the Court's decisions and treat them as binding
law, especially in controversial cases.").
25 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 243 (1995) ("The Court's
survival and flourishing depend on the political acceptability of its results").
26 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
27 Id. at 866.
28 See id. at 865-66 ("The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that
allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political
pressures ").
29 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Casey explains why the Court
must take care to preserve its institutional legitimacy, especially when deciding
politically contentious cases. See id. at 864-69.
30 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Of course, Hamilton was
referring to the judicial branch defined by the not-yet-ratified Constitution of the
United States.
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engendered by a decision that is perceived to be politically motivated.3'
The absence of an executive organ in the United Nations means that
compliance with the ICJ is left to the litigants' good faith.32 An ICJ
opinion that is perceived as motivated by something other than legal
principle can cause an immediate loss of legitimacy for the ICJ because
the opinion will simply be ignored.33  For example, despite the
considerable pressure exerted on Israel,34 the ICJ's order to dismantle the
3' For example, the decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam),
which effectively decided the 2000 presidential election, "left a large segment of
society feeling as if the election came down to a vote of five to four, on partisan
grounds." See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the
Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 237, 297 & n.362 (2002) (noting survey results after the decision that 37%
of Americans believed the decision to be "based on partisan politics").
Nevertheless, "[t]he Court's ability to command obedience remains largely
unaffected by Bush v. Gore." Balkin, supra note 24, at 1450.
32 The Security Council has some enforcement capability at its disposal, but the
permanent members' veto power combined with the fact that the Security
Council has requested only two advisory opinions in nearly 60 years indicates
that its role in this regard may be limited.
33 Although this is certainly true for advisory opinions, contentious cases are
often ignored by the parties subject to an adverse decision. Posner & Yoo,
supra note 9, at 38-42.
34 The United Nations General Assembly voted 150-6 with 10 abstentions to
demand that Israel comply with the Barrier Opinion. G.A. Res. ES-10/15, U.N.
GAOR, 10th Emer. Spec. Sess., 27th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/PV.27
(2004). To be sure, there could conceivably have been more pressure on Israel
to comply had the United States voted in favor of the resolution. But such
pressure would not be strictly political-the United States gives about $4 billion
in foreign aid to Israel and guarantees about $10 billion in loans, and the United
States has threatened Israel with financial consequences in the past. See, e.g.,
Mary Curtius, After Clash On Israel, Support Grows On Aid To Republics,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 22, 1992, at 21 (noting President Bush's "refus[al] to
support Israel's request for $10 billion in loan guarantees" because of continued
settlement construction in the West Bank). In addition, the United States has
criticized Israel's security barrier on other occasions. See, e.g., Greg Myre,
Israelis to Extend Barrier Deeper Into the West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2004, at A 11 (noting that American officials had expressed "concern" about the
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
barrier has yet to be carried out.35 A further consequence of the ICJ's
ephemeral authority is that, as a U.N. organ, any significant erosion of
the ICJ's legitimacy undermines the standing of the United Nations-an
entity whose influence over sovereign states' behavior is already far from
assured.3 6
International judicial bodies such as the ICJ have the potential to
strengthen the mechanisms for ensuring compliance with international
legal norms. Generally, the only source of power for courts, whether
domestic or international, is "the soundness in law of their opinions."
37
For the ICJ, the absence of an executive increases the risk that decisions
that are not considered legitimate will be ignored. In turn, when ICJ
decisions are more often seen as politically motivated rather than "legally
principled,, 38 the ICJ's ability to influence the development of
international law is undermined. 39  This puts the ICJ at risk of
barrier's route). The point, however, is that at international level, political
pressure may not be sufficient to compel compliance with ICJ decisions.
35 See Dan Izenberg, State: ICJ Fence Ruling 'Biased', JERUSALEM POST, Feb.
23, 2005. (Although the Israeli Supreme Court asked the government to respond
to the Barrier Opinion, it is highly unlikely that the ICJ's order to stop
construction and dismantle the security barrier will cause Israel to do so).
36 See, e.g., TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 69-78 (1996) (describing the difficulties that the International Atomic
Energy Agency had ensuring Iraq's compliance with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty during the years leading up to Israel's bombing of Osiraq on
June 7, 1981); Kretzmer, supra note 6, at 102 (observing that "international
mechanisms for ensuring compliance with norms of [international humanitarian
law] have always been extremely weak"); cf Casey, 505 U.S. at 868. ("If the
Court's legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would the country be in its
very ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals. The Court's concern
with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation to
which it is responsible."); MICHLA POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE LEAGUE AND U.N. ERAS 26 n.87 (1973)
(noting that the "organic connection" between the PCIJ and the League of
Nations meant that the prestige of the PCIJ was dependent on the League's
credibility and authority and recommending a severing of this connection
between the ICJ and the U.N.).
37 Kretzmer, supra note 6, at 102.
38 Casey, 505 U.S. at 866.
39 Cf Kretzmer, supra note 6, at 102 (making a similar argument with respect to
the International Criminal Court).
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becoming-if it is not already-the "least dangerous" institution in the
international legal order.
Despite the ramifications for the ICJ and its effectiveness as an
institution, it would be naive to expect a particular judge or group of
judges to render "legally principled" decisions in a particular case
because of some abstract notion of the importance of preserving
institutional legitimacy. Conflicting ideologies and political pressures
will often be too powerful to resist, even for the most principled judge.
Instead, for a judicial institution to issue "legally principled" decisions in
case after case, it must develop a structure and procedures to provide
judges with the tools to resist such pressures.
A mechanism that contributes much towards this end is the
socialization of judges that comes from the interactions between courts in
a hierarchical judicial system. In addition to the obvious fact that
appellate review serves to correct the mistaken judgments of lower
courts, the prospective effect on a judge's decision-making process of an
appellate body waiting to review each and every opinion cannot be
underestimated. Judges like to be affirmed, not reversed-they want to
get it right the first time.40 In a three-tiered system like the United States
federal judiciary, this dynamic exists between both between the district
courts and the appeals courts, and between the appeals courts and the
Supreme Court.
This pressure that appellate courts exert on lower court judges is
not the whole picture. Automatic review of district court judgments by
appellate courts certainly casts a shadow over district judges' decisions.
But appellate decisions are likely to be final-the Supreme Court has
rejected over 98% of all petitions for certiorari filed in recent years. 4
And of course, the Supreme Court itself has no court waiting to review
40 For example, Judge Posner "speak[s] from experience" when he notes that
"[j]udges don't like to be reversed." POSNER, supra note 25, at 118.
4' There were 7,814 Supreme Court filings in the 2003 Term, of which 91 cases
were heard. In the prior term, there were 8,255 filings and 84 cases argued. U.S.
SuP. CT., 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 (2005),
available at http://uscourts.gov/ttb/jan05ttb/2004/index.html (last visited
February 27, 2006).
2006]
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its rulings.42  Yet actual or effective finality does not generally lead
Supreme Court or appellate judges to disregard legal principles and
decide cases based on personal preferences or political predilections. 4
This may be partly explained by the fact that federal appellate judges and
Supreme Court justices are highly qualified and conscientious in
fulfilling their judicial duties. There is no reason to believe that the same
is not true of ICJ judges.44 Unlike ICJ opinions, however, federal
appellate and Supreme Court decisions are subject to a sort of indirect
review-either on remand to a lower court or on subsequent appeals in
the same case. In fact, some complex cases traverse up to the Supreme
Court and back to the district court multiple times during the litigation.45
At every level, each opinion is written by a judge who is quite conscious
of the fact that the opinion will be reviewed or applied by another court
in a later stage of litigation.
This "conversation" between the various tiers of courts in the
federal judicial system helps to ensure that the opinion that forms each
judge's monologue is a "legally principled" decision in its own right.
The ICJ, however, has no other courts to "converse" with during the
process of rendering a decision. As noted above, it is both a court of first
42 Supreme Court decisions are overruled by legislation, but this is rare. POSNER,
supra note 25, at 118 n. 18. As such, a jurisdiction's highest court "does not have
the final word because it is correct, but is nevertheless correct because it has the
final word." Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 513 N.W.2d 773, 790 (Mich.
1994) (Brickley, J., dissenting).
43 To be sure, in politically and socially contentious cases, the votes of Supreme
Court justices may be based more on policy preferences than on dispassionate
legal reasoning. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS 2 - 4
(2002). Nevertheless, the vast majority of opinions issued to justify the
decisions of the justices are largely based on legal-not policy-grounds.
44 See Richard A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel's
Security Wall, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 46 (2005) (noting the "high stature of the
jurists on the [ICJ] at present").
45 For example, by the time the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decided Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2003), the case had been heard three times by a three-judge appellate panel,
reviewed once by the entire Federal Circuit sitting en banc, and twice by the
Supreme Court.
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instance and a court of last resort.46 The absence of a hierarchical
judicial system and the resultant lack of review by other courts contribute
to two significant problems. First, as discussed in Part III, the flat
institutional structure increases the risk that ICJ judges will succumb to
pressures from outside entities.47 The susceptibility to political influence
is especially acute when the ICJ is exercising its advisory function
because of the Court's institutional proximity to the bodies that request
those opinions, most notably the United Nations General Assembly.
Second, as explained in Part II, because the ICJ is not divided into
several layers of courts that can separate the fact-finding function from
the application of the law to those facts, the ICJ must undertake the
difficult task of simultaneously investigating facts while formulating the
oftentimes novel standards used to adjudicate the legal significance of
those facts.48
II. THE ICJ AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: TOO CLOSE FOR
COMFORT
Advisory opinions come to the ICJ by request of other United
Nations organs,49 and the General Assembly makes such requests far
46 See supra text accompanying note 9. The U.S. Supreme Court's exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear cases between two states is somewhat similar to the
ICJ's role in contentious cases. Such original-jurisdiction cases often involve
the same kinds of issues heard in the ICJ, such as disputes over boundaries or
water rights. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 650-51 & n.15
(2003). There are two notable differences, however. First, states can be sued
without their consent. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290, 319 (1907)
(holding that a state's sovereign immunity does not extend to suits brought by
other states). Second, the U.S. Supreme Court always appoints a special master
to conduct any necessary fact-finding because it recognizes that it is ill-equipped
to sit as a trial court. CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 649. The ICJ also has the
authority to appoint a special master for fact-finding, but it rarely does so.
Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 53 & n.10; see also infra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text.
41 See infra Part III.
48 See infra Part III.
49 U.N. CHARTER art. 96, 1.
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more frequently than any other body.5 ° Just as compliance with ICJ
judgments depends on the Court's perceived legitimacy, the extent to
which the General Assembly itself is viewed as credible is a factor
impacting the level of compliance with its own resolutions. 51  Not
surprisingly, the General Assembly's credibility improves when it acts
with "objectivity, reliability, and restraint," whereas it is damaged when
it issues resolutions that are "biased, arbitrary, and intemperate.
' ' 2
Especially when the motivations of the General Assembly are closer to
the latter than the former, the ICJ's own legitimacy is adversely affected
when it appears to simply "rubber stamp" the General Assembly's
position on a particular issue.
53
The General Assembly has a long history of bias in its response
to the Arab-Israeli conflict, caused in part by a substantial bloc of nations
that have always voted against Israel and are likely to continue to do so.
54
The resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the
security barrier-"far from being legally neutral"-was no exception.
For example, the resolution refers to the security barrier as "the wall"
rather than using the less contentious term "barrier," let alone the more
physically accurate term "fence." 56 In addition, the resolution calls the
50 The ICJ has issued twenty-five advisory opinions, fifteen of which were
requested by the General Assembly. No other U.N. organ has requested more
than two advisory opinions.
5' BLAINE SLOAN, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS IN OUR
CHANGING WORLD 117-18 (1991).52 d. at 117.
53 Cf RICHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 169 (1986) (noting that the
1962 Certain Expenses advisory opinion "appeared to be . 'a rubber stamp'
for the [General] Assembly").
54 See generally ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, ANTI-ISRAEL BIAS AT THE U.N.
(noting many instances of apparent bias at the United Nations against Israel), at
http://www.adl.org/intemational/2004-09_un-ant-israelbias.pdf (last visited
February 27, 2006).
55 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 1, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans,
25, 26; see also Pomerance, supra note 3, at 31 & n.32 (internal quotations
omitted).
56 The choice of terminology has long been a significant issue in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Just as Palestinian supporters prefer the term "wall" because it implies
an imposing permanent structure, Israel's supporters prefer the term "fence"
because it implies the opposite. Nevertheless, when completed, approximately
[Vol. 14:2
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territory in question the "Occupied Palestinian Territory" rather than
using the more geographically descriptive term "West Bank, 57 and it
makes no mention of the wider context that, at least arguably, lead to the
barrier's construction-that since September, 2000, Palestinian terrorists
have killed over 900 Israelis, including 400 civilians killed and 5,000
civilians injured "by suicide bombers who easily crossed over the Green
Line from the West Bank"58 to intentionally target public buses,
59 cafes, 60
and nightclubs 61 in pre-1967 Israel.
Any court must be vigilant to maintain its independence from the
political branches of government if it is to maintain its credibility as a
judicial body.62 This is especially true for the ICJ when an advisory
6% of the security barrier will be a concrete wall, which according to Israel was
built only in areas where snipers have targeted Israeli homes and cars. The other
94% consists of two parallel chain link fences equipped with electronic sensors
and separated by a ditch and barbed wire. This structure is certainly more
imposing than a suburban backyard fence, but to call it a "wall" could be
considered inaccurate. Given that "wall" is the term favored by Israel's
ideological opponents, its use by the General Assembly, and especially by the
ICJ, is arguably quite biased.
5' Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 1. "Occupied Palestinian Territory" is
generally the term favored by Palestinian supporters. Conversely, Palestinians
could rightly accuse the General Assembly of bias if it referred to the West Bank
as "Judea and Samaria," the biblical names for the West Bank used by many
Israelis.
58 Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 55.
59 E.g., Etgar Lefkovits, 19 Killed in Jerusalem Bus Bombing, JERUSALEM POST,
June 19, 2002, at 1.
60 E.g., Charles A. Radin, 13 Israelis Killed in Bus Stop, Cafe Blasts, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2003, at Al.
61 E.g., Phil Reeves & Eric Silver, Suicide Bomber Kills 17 in Attack Outside Tel
Aviv Disco, INDEPENDENT (London), June 2, 2001, at 1.
62 Unlike domestic courts, the ICJ must also take care to maintain its
independence from individual states, and some commentators have applauded
the ICJ's independence from powerful nations such as the United States. See,
e.g., Falk, supra note 44, at 45. While the ICJ should be independent from
particular states, when it comes to the ICJ's advisory function, it is
independence from the General Assembly that is critical to maintaining the
legitimacy of the ICJ when exercising its advisory function. As such, the debate
regarding the independence of international tribunals from state entities misses
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opinion is requested by the General Assembly because the risk that the
ICJ will find itself deciding cases on political, rather than legal, grounds
is especially high. The ICJ has noted that it should abstain when "giving
an advisory opinion [is] incompatible with the Court's judicial
character. '63 In theory, upon each request for an advisory opinion, the
ICJ must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction and should not abstain for
reasons of propriety, regardless of whether any interested parties object
or refuse to appear.64 In practice, however, this requirement has become
nothing more than an "arid formalism"-the ICJ has never abstained
from giving an advisory opinion and often seems to "rubber stamp" the
General Assembly's position.65 Rather than a duty to abstain, the ICJ has
the point entirely. See, e.g., Posner & Yoo, supra note 9, at 7 (arguing that
"independence [from states] prevents international tribunals from being
effective" in part because states are unwilling to submit to compulsory
jurisdiction if they perceive the judges as beyond their control); Laurence R.
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REv. 899, 902 (2005) ("Can
dependent judges really contribute more to the global rule of law or to
international cooperation than their independent brethren? We doubt it, and
Posner and Yoo have not shown it.").
63 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 47; see also MICHLA POMERANCE, THE
ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE LEAGUE AND U.N.
ERAS 26 n.87 (1973) (noting that the "organic connection" between the PCIJ
and the League of Nations meant that the prestige of the PCIJ was dependent on
the League's credibility and authority and recommending a severing of this
connection between the ICJ and the U.N.).
64 GBENGA ODUNTAN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE (1945-1996), at 107 (1999); see also, e.g., Barrier Opinion, supra
note 2, at 45 ("[T]he Court ... [must] satisfy itself, each time it is seised of a
request for an opinion, as to the propriety of the exercise of its judicial
function.").
65 Cf FALK, supra note 53, at 169 (1986) (noting that the 1962 Certain Expenses
advisory opinion "appeared to be . . . 'a rubber stamp' for the [General]
Assembly"). In Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 235, 14, the ICJ found that it had no jurisdiction to hear
the case because the question, asked by the World Health Organization, was
beyond the competence of the requesting organ. Only once, in Status of Eastern
Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 (July 23), did the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the ICJ's predecessor, abstain from hearing a case for
reasons of propriety because the Soviet Union objected to the proceedings and
THE WORLD COURT'S ADVISORY FUNCTION
developed a "duty to cooperate at all costs" with the General Assembly.
This has blurred the line between the political machinations of the
General Assembly and the legal function of the ICJ and "calls into
question the judicial nature of the advisory role., 66
Since the drafting of the U.N. Charter, countries have been
concerned about the need to prevent the advisory function from being
used to circumvent a state's refusal to consent to the Court's
jurisdiction.67  The ICJ has previously distinguished between legal
controversies that arise "during the proceedings of the General
Assembly" and cases that arise "independently in bilateral relations.
68
That distinction led the Court to recognize that when an advisory opinion
arises out of a bilateral dispute, "the lack of consent of an interested State
may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the
Court's judicial character."69 The Court explained that it should refrain
from giving an advisory opinion "when the circumstances disclose that to
give a reply would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a
State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial
settlement without its consent.,
70
In the Barrier Opinion, however, the Court pays lip service to its
prior prudential advice. The Court brushed off concerns about backdoor
jurisdiction by noting that it "does not consider that the subject matter of
the General Assembly's request . . . as only a bilateral matter between
Israel and Palestine."'" But the fact that other states and the General
was not a member of the League of Nations. POMERANCE, supra note 36, at 65-
69.
66 Pomerance, supra note 3, at 40-41. This duty to cooperate developed early.
In one of its first advisory opinions, the Court stated that the request for an
advisory opinion "in principle, should not be refused." Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion,
1950 I.C.J. at 71 (Mar. 30) [hereinafter Peace Treaties].
67 See POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 26 n.86 (discussing concerns voiced prior to
the San Francisco Conference of the need "to avoid a species of indirect
compulsory jurisdiction").
68 Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, at 25 34.
69 Peace Treaties, supra note 66, at 71.
70 Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, at 25 32-33, quoted by Barrier Opinion,
supra note 2, at 47.
7' Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 47-49.
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Assembly are interested in the conflict between Israel and Palestine does
not explain why the dispute should be adjudicated by the Court when one
of the disputants does not consent to the Court's jurisdiction. Moreover,
it certainly does not render the dispute one that arose "during the
proceedings of the General Assembly.,
72
The legality of the security barrier's construction is inextricably
entangled with the ongoing dispute between Israel and the Palestinians.
The Oslo Accords were a bilateral agreement finalized in 1993 between
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") whereby Israel
would cede territory to the Palestinian Authority ("PA") to create a
Palestinian state, and the PLO would recognize Israel's right to exist
within secure and recognized borders.73 Israel began constructing the
barrier in late 2002 after two years of unremitting terrorist attacks
originating from PA controlled areas of the West Bank 74 that
immediately followed the collapse of the bilateral framework created by
the Oslo Accords.75 Furthermore, the General Assembly has repeatedly
called for Israel and Palestine to resolve the conflict through "bilateral
negotiations. 76 In a classic understatement, the Court recognized that
Israel and Palestine "have expressed radically divergent views., 77 But
despite decades of conflict and failed negotiation attempts the Court
72 Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, at 25 34.
73 The PLO was created in 1964 by the Arab League under the leadership of
Egyptian President Gamal Abdul-Nasser to engage in violent acts against Israel
without precipitating a direct confrontation between Israel and its neighbors.
BARUCH KIMMERLING & JOEL S. MIGDAL, THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE 248
(2003).
14 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
75 Even for those who argue that terrorist attacks are merely a pretense to justify
the barrier's construction, the dispute's bilateral nature remains unchanged.
76 Immediately preceding the request for an advisory opinion, the General
Assembly expressed its concern that the construction of the barrier could
"prejudge future negotiations." G.A. Res. ES-10/13, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emer.
Spec. Sess., 22d plen. mtg., Agenda item 5, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/13
(2003); see also G.A. Res. 51/29, U.N. GAOR, 51st sess., agenda item 33, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/51/29 (1996) (supporting, among other things, the "bilateral
negotiations" started at Madrid in 1991, where the Oslo process was initiated).
77 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 48.
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found that the dispute concerning the barrier's legality did not arise
"independently in bilateral relations."
78
The ICJ cites the Peace Treaties and Western Sahara advisory
opinions to support its refusal to decline to hear the case for reasons of
propriety, stating that no country "can prevent the giving of an Advisory
Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to
obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take."79 The
United Nations, however, had already decided its "course of action"
when the General Assembly declared the security barrier "in
contradiction to relevant provisions of international law" two months
before asking the ICJ whether the security barrier violates international
law.80 While it is true that no state can prevent the Court from giving an
advisory opinion, it does not follow that the Court must answer every
question posed to it by the General Assembly. The ICJ's justification
that "it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an
advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly" 81 hardly seems consistent
with the proscription that "the Court ... [must] satisfy itself, each time it
is seized of a request for an opinion, as to the propriety of the exercise of
its judicial function.' 82
Given that Israel's opponents are generally able to muster a
majority for General Assembly resolutions condemning Israel,83 and that
the General Assembly has a long history of singling out Israel for
78 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 47, quoting Peace Treaties, supra note 66;
see also Pomerance, supra note 3, at 34 (criticizing the Court for its
characterization of the conflict as merely "radically divergent views").
79 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 47.
80 The General Assembly had declared in Resolution ES-10/13 that the security
barrier was "in contradiction to relevant provisions of international law" before
asking the ICJ for its opinion on the barrier's legality. Pomerance, supra note 3,
at 31. The General Assembly's practice of first answering the question and then
asking the ICJ for an advisory opinion "is not consonant with the judicial
character and independence of the Court." STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1994).
81 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 61.
82 Id. at 22 45.
83 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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rebuke8 4 and excluding it from participation in various U.N. functions,
85
the ICJ ought to be especially vigilant to decide for itself the propriety of
answering a request from the General Assembly for an advisory opinion
on matters related to Israel. At the very least, the one-sided language of
the General Assembly's request should have caused the ICJ to "raise a
suspicious judicial eyebrow."8 6 In Reviving the World Court, Richard
Falk observes "part of what makes a judgment finally acceptable is the
belief by the losing side that it unqualifiedly has had its full day in
court."87  Unfortunately, the ICJ appears unconcerned about such
limitations on its advisory function. "The notion of judicial caution
implicit in ... proceedings before the Permanent Court of International
Justice was an apt acknowledgment of these limits, perhaps too easily
84 An especially egregious example is General Assembly Resolution 3379,
passed in 1975, declaring that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial
discrimination," thus making Zionism the only nationalist movement thus
classified. G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2400th plen. mtg. at 83-84
(1975). The resolution was repealed in 1991, but all 19 Arab member states
either voted against repeal or were absent. That Israel has always been persona
non grata at the United Nations leads to the cynical view among some Israeli
policymakers that the General Assembly "is nothing other than the executive
committee of the Third World dictatorships." Dan Izenberg, Avineri: UN is Part
of Problem, Not Part of Solution, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 5, 200 1, at 2 (quoting
Israel Foreign Ministry Director-General Shlomo Avineri).
85 Israel has never served on the Security Council, and an Israeli judge has never
sat on the ICJ because only countries that are members of a regional group may
participate in these bodies. Regional groups are organized on the basis of
geography, and the Asian Group has never permitted Israel to become a
member. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2001: ISRAEL, THE
OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, AND PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
TERRITORIES: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (2001), available
at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/mideast/israel3.html (last visited February 27,
2006). However, in May 2000, the West European and Others Group (WEOG),
which is the only non-geographically based group, allowed Israel to join, albeit
on a conditional basis that requires renewal every four years. Id.; see also ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 54, at 8 (noting that Israel has traditionally
been excluded from the regional groups and has only recently been accepted as a
temporary member of the WEOG).
16 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87 FALK, supra note 53, at 33.
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ignored by the [ICJ] in the more difficult-that is, more politicized-
environment of its operations."
8
III. DIVISION OF LABOR: FINDINGS OF FACT AND QUESTIONS OF
LAW
In the United States federal legal system, another element of the
"conversation" between courts8 9 is that different courts are presumed to
have different levels of competence with respect to making findings of
fact as compared with reaching conclusions of law. While an appellate
court reviews de novo a lower court's conclusions of law, it must accept
a lower court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.9 ° This
division of labor has existed since the nation's founding, 9' and the
Supreme Court has given the rationale that "trial judges have the unique
opportunity to consider the evidence in the living courtroom context
while appellate judges see only the cold paper record. 92 For the rare
instances when a case is heard by the Supreme Court on original
jurisdiction, the Court appoints a special master to conduct any necessary
fact finding because it is unwieldy and impractical for nine justices to sit
as a trial court.93 The Court then reviews the record developed by the
special master as it would review a record developed by a lower court in
a case heard in the usual manner.
In cases with straightforward facts about which the parties agree,
as well as in cases with complex disputed facts but well-settled legal
standards, the division of labor between trial courts and appellate courts
is less significant than it is for cases with disputed facts that also involve
88 Id. at 32 n. 10.
89 See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
90 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 (1995).
91 The differing standards of review for factual and legal findings stems from the
Seventh Amendment's proscription that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Gasperini v. Ctr.
for Humanities, Inc. 518 U.S. 415, 438 (1996) (discussing the development of
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence).
92 Id. at 438 (citations omitted).
93 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, at 649.
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novel legal questions. While the appellate function is important in either
circumstance, when both the facts and the law are at issue, a trial court
must undertake the difficult task of developing an effective general legal
standard while simultaneously uncovering the facts to which that legal
standard must be applied. In such cases, the quality control provided by
appellate review is most apparent. Precisely because an appellate court
only has access to the "cold paper record," it is sufficiently separate from
the underlying factual dispute to more objectively analyze any novel
legal questions. With this distance, appellate courts can better formulate
the relevant legal test and remand to the trial court to conduct a more
focused factual inquiry with that test in mind.94
It is essential that the fact-finder not also have the final word on
questions of law, especially when novel legal issues are raised. First,
litigants uninformed by the applicable legal standards will have difficulty
presenting a court with the information it needs to resolve the dispute.
The difficulty for the court is then compounded because legal standards
cannot be adequately applied to resolve a dispute if the court lacks a
detailed factual record. The Barrier Opinion suffers from the latter
problem far more than the former, and others have pointed out the
opinion's many omissions and the Court's "apparent inability to grapple
with complex fact patterns associated with armed conflict." 95  The
discussion below focuses on the ICJ's nearly exclusive reliance on the
dossier provided by the Secretary General in lieu of conducting an
independent factual investigation and explains how this reliance may
94 The Supreme Court has overruled appeals courts that intrude upon trial courts'
find-finding capacity. To be sure, the Supreme Court itself has ignored these
boundaries but has been harshly criticized by dissenting justices for doing so.
Compare Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986) ("If the
Court of Appeals believed that the District Court had failed to make findings of
fact essential to a proper resolution of the legal question, it should have
remanded to the District Court to make those findings."), with Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 440 U.S. 69, 86 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting
in part) ("Having formulated a new legal standard, the Court then applies it here
in the first instance rather than remanding the case .... Given the numerous
ambiguities in the record, I believe the Court thereby improperly arrogates to
itself the role of the trier of fact.").
95 Murphy, Pomerance, and Wedgwood all discuss the Court's poor fact-finding.
Murphy, supra note 4, at 62-63; Pomerance, supra note 3, at 37-38;
Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 53-54.
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have lead to the Court's inaccurate assessment of Israel's security
needs.96 Then, Part IV discusses how the Court's failure to inquire into
the facts may have led to the questionable holding that Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter is inapplicable and argues that the Barrier
Opinion is better understood as a contentious case in disguise.
A. The Secretary General's Dossier
The ICJ limited its factual investigation to a collection of eighty-
eight "dossiers" submitted by the U.N. Secretary General.97 While one
might presume that United Nations' extensive involvement with the
Israel-Palestine conflict renders such evidence sufficient, 98 a closer
examination of the dossiers' contents reveals that they contain little that
could be called "evidence," and even that small amount is generally one-
sided.99 Of the eighty-eight dossiers, thirty-two are General Assembly
resolutions, draft resolutions, and verbatim meeting records,'00 twenty-
two are similar Security Council materials, °1 and an additional fourteen
dossiers consist of treaties and other general documents such as the
96 See discussion infra Parts V.A.-B.
97 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 57. The ICJ also stated that "many other
documents issued by the Israeli Government ... are in the public domain." Id.
The opinion, however, does not appear to make use of any of this information in
reaching its conclusions. Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 53; see also infra note
141.
98 The ICJ itself made such an argument. Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at
55-58.
9' Imagine an analogous domestic situation: if a United States federal court
limited its fact finding in a politically-charged case to a report submitted by the
Bush White House, and the Republican-controlled Congress had already taken
an official position about the case, one could hardly expect the opinion to be
viewed as well founded, especially if the court's opinion just happened to agree
with Congress' position.
'00 Introductory Note and List of Contents of the Dossier prepared by the
Secretariat of the United Nations, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm (last visited February 27, 2006)
[hereinafter "Dossier"]. The relevant materials are Nos. 1-23, 40-42, 78-83
and are referenced on pages 7-8, 9-10, and 13.
10' Id. at 9, 10, and 13. The relevant materials are Nos. 24-39, 43-47, 84.
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Fourth Geneva Convention, the Hague Convention, and the Oslo
Accords. 10 2  Of the remaining twenty dossiers, eight are reports by
various specialized U.N. organs, seven are letters from various U.N.
representatives,'0 3 and five are reports produced by the Secretary
General. 104
As a preliminary point, the Court ought to have been skeptical
about the objectivity of the 32 dossiers containing General Assembly
records. Regardless of whether this advisory opinion is better viewed as
a contentious case between Israel and Palestine, 10 5 it is apparent that
Israel and the General Assembly took opposite positions in that Israel
objected to the General Assembly's decision to request the opinion. 10 6 In
light of this conflict, the Court ought to have been concerned that thirty-
two dossiers-over one third of the materials-consisted of General
Assembly resolutions and meeting records. This fact may partially
explain why the Barrier Opinion is in general agreement with the
General Assembly's previously stated position on the security barrier. 10
In addition, the twenty-two dossiers of Security Council records do not
seem relevant to the question of the security barrier's legality. Although
construction of the barrier did not begin until 2002, thirteen of the
Security Council resolutions submitted in the dossiers were adopted prior
to 2002.'08 The ICJ's characterization of such resolutions and other
documents as "evidence"' 9 undermines the ICJ's assessment that it had a
"voluminous" amount of evidence of the barrier's "humanitarian and
socio-economic impact on the Palestinian population."'  Moreover, as
is discussed below, the remaining dossiers could hardly be said to satisfy
the Court's fact-finding obligations.
102 Id. at 11-12. The relevant materials are Nos. 57-70.
103 Id. at 12-13. The relevant materials are Nos. 71-77 and are discussed below
in Part IV.
104 Id. at 10. The relevant materials are Nos. 48-52.
105 See infra Part III.
106 Pomerance, supra note 3, at 34.
107 See Pomerance, supra note 3, at 31.
108 In addition, although Security Council resolutions are binding, they are not
considered to be "determinative legal judgments" on a given issue. Otherwise,
the ICJ would be superfluous. MCCORMACK, supra note 36, at 24-26.
109 The treaty materials comprise nearly 400 pages of the 1152 pages of dossiers.
'10 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 57.
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The eight dossiers produced by specialized U.N. organs are
authored by entities that can hardly be said to be neutral with respect to
the Arab-Israeli conflict and are telling for what they omit. Four of these
dossiers consist of a report by the Mission to the Humanitarian and
Emergency Policy Group ("HEPG") of the Local Aid Coordination
Committee entitled "The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on
Affected West Bank Communities.""' Two dossiers are reports from
Special Rapporteurs of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
("CHR").1 2 One dossier is a report from the U.N. Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the
Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (Israeli
Practices Committee)," 3 and one is a excerpt from the Report of the
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People ("CEIPP")."14
It is interesting to note both the track record of the authors of
these dossiers as well as the fact that these reports were included while
others were not. First, the HEPG reports on the impact of the security
barrier on Palestinian communities demonstrate the noticeable absence of
an analogous report submitted to the ICJ concerning the impact of
Palestinian suicide bombers on Israeli communities. Second, the CHR
has recently been the subject of much criticism for its generally anti-
Israel bias: over 25 percent of its resolutions solely reference Israel,
while none refer to such notorious human rights violators as Libya 15 and
Syria.1l6 In fact, such abuses contributed to the Secretary General's
l Dossier, supra note 100, at 14. The relevant materials are Nos. 85-88.
112 Id. at 11. The relevant materials are Nos. 55-56.
113 Id. The relevant material is No. 53.
"14 Id. The relevant material is No. 54.
115 See Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to
Thabo Mbeki, President, South Africa (Aug. 6, 2002) (objecting to Libya's
appointment to CHR chair because of its "long record of human rights abuse"),
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/mbekiltr0806.pdf (last visited
February 27, 2006).
116 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003 (detailing Syria's many
human rights violations), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast7.html
(last visited February 27, 2005).
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recent recommendation that the CHR be abolished.'1 Third, the Israeli
Practices Committee is comprised of three member states, Sri Lanka,
Malaysia, and Senegal, and the report was the product of the
Committee's 12 day visit to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.' 1 8 First, it is
difficult to comprehend what the Israeli Practices Committee could have
learned about Israeli practices by visiting Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.
Second, although the report claims balance by noting that its 31
interviews included meetings with "representatives of Israeli [non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs")]," a quick scan of the NGO list
indicates that the small handful of Israeli representatives were from
organizations such as B'Tselem, the Israeli Committee Against House
Demolition, and the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel." 9
These NGOs are avowedly partisan. One can hardly expect a report
based on information they provided to contain a balanced presentation of
the relevant evidence-let alone to express Israel's official position-
concerning the security barrier's legality.
Finally, regarding the CEIPP report, it is sufficient to note that
one of its early actions was to recommend that November 29th be
declared an annual "International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian
People.' ' °  On that day in 1947, the General Assembly approved
Resolution 181 partitioning Palestine into two states, one Jewish and the
other Palestinian. Given the unanimous rejection of that resolution by
the Arab states, November 29 is an odd date to choose for an anniversary
that is essentially dedicated to highlighting Israel's misdeeds. As with
the reports discussed above, while the CEIPP report may provide the ICJ
17 Specifically, the Secretary General suggested replacing the CHR with a new
Human Rights Council. The Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 181-83, U.N. Doc.
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). The Secretary General explained that "the
Commission's capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined
by its declining credibility and professionalism. In particular, States have
sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to
protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others. As a result, a
credibility deficit has developed .... Id. at 182.
118 See Report of the Special Comm. to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the
Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied
Territories, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/58/311 (Aug. 22, 2003).
1 9 See id. at 26.
120 See G. A. Res. 32/40 B (Dec. 2, 1977).
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with useful information, the fact that there are no counterbalancing
reports representing Israel's views is highly problematic.
1 21
The Court's failure to question the dossiers' sufficiency is
especially egregious, given that it describes "the purported harm to
Palestinians without describing one terrorist act against Israelis which
preceded the fence's construction. ' 22 As a result of this imbalance,
several of the Judges filed separate opinions expressing concern about
the Court's failure to inquire into the "Israeli side of the picture."' 23 That
the Court chose to proceed as if "the facts do not matter"' 124 is made evenmore apparent by the cursory treatment of Israel's security concerns.
B. The ICJ Assessment of Israel's Security Concerns
The remaining seven dossiers in the Secretary General's
submission to the ICJ that have not yet been discussed are letters
submitted by the U.N. Representatives for Palestine, Syria, Malaysia,
Iran, and Kuwait,12 5 all of whom make no effort to hide their disdain for
Israel.126 More relevant for the sufficiency of the ICJ's fact-finding, the
121 See Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, Separate Opinion of Judge Owada
[hereinafter Owada Opinion], at 23-26 (observing that "the Israeli
construction of the wall has not come about in a vacuum" and expressing
concern that "material on this point from the Israeli side is not available").
122 Anne Bayefsky, One Small Step, Address before the United Nations
conference on Confronting Anti-Semitism: Education for Tolerance and
Understanding (June 21, 2004), available at WALL ST. J. OPINION J.,
http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=1 10005245 (last visited February 27,
2006), quoted in Pomerance, supra note 3, at 36 n.60.
123 See, e.g., Owada Opinion, supra note 121, at 22; see also Barrier Opinion,
supra note 2, Declaration of Judge Buergenthal [hereinafter "Buergenthal
Declaration"], at 7 ("[T]he Court fails to address any facts or evidence
specifically rebutting Israel's claim of military exigencies or requirements of
national security."); Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 54 & n. 16 (citing the Owada
Opinion and the Buergenthal Declaration, as well as the Separate Opinion of
Judge Higgins and the Written Statement of the United States).
124 See Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 54.
125 See Dossier, supra note 100, Nos. 71-77.
126 Mahathir bin Mohamad, Opening Speech at the Tenth Session of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (Oct. 16, 2003), available at
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only two letters that contain actual substantive information about the
construction of the barrier are from the Permanent Observer of
Palestine. 27 However, both letters are more accurately characterized as
partisan arguments rather than as independent evidence. For example,
the first begins by stating that "Israel, the occupying Power, continues to
plan and erect the conquest wall that it has been illegally building in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,"'' 28 while the
second informs the Secretary General that the Barrier is being
constructed as "part and parcel of the Israeli Government's expansionist
designs throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory... that have been
affected... by Israel's incessant settlement colonialism."'
' 29
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/20/1066502121884.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2006). In his opening speech at the Tenth Session of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference on October 16, 2003, Malaysian President Mahathir
bin Mohamad stated that many Muslims believe that they "will forever be
oppressed and dominated by the Europeans and the Jews." Id. He advocated
"devise[ing] . . . a strategy that can win [Muslims] final victory" in Palestine,
and to learn from the Jews' experience: "The Europeans killed 6 million Jews
out of 12 million. But today the Jews rule this world by proxy. They get others
to fight and die for them." Id.; see also BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: SYRIA (Oct. 2005),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) (Israel
and Syria have been officially in a state of war for several decades.); Anne
Penketh, Iran 's Leader Says Jewish State 'Should Be Wiped From Map',
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 27, 2005, available at
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle east/article322539.ece (last visited
Feb. 27, 2006) (reporting that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has
recently called for Israel to be "wiped off the map"); BUREAU OF NEAR
EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: IRAN (Aug.
2005) [hereinafter "U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: IRAN"],
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm (last visited Feb 27, 2006) (noting
that Iran has for years funded Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups that are
"violently opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process").
127 See Dossier, supra note 100, Nos. 71 & 72. Four other letters are merely
requests to resume the Tenth Emergency Special Session, and the fifth is a
proposal for a draft resolution declaring that the security barrier violates
international law. Id. Nos. 73-77.
128 Id. No. 71 (emphasis added).
129 Id. No. 72 (emphasis added).
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The letters' conclusory language and repeated references to
"colonialism" and "the conquest wall" are not evidence. These
references are arguments that might fairly be included in a nation's
statements to the Court but which have no place in the Secretary
General's submissions. If such views are to be included, it would seem
reasonable for the dossiers to contain letters from Israel's U.N.
Representative as well. For example, in a letter to the Security Council
dated one week after the letters described above, Israel's U.N.
Representative states that
On Saturday, 4 October 2003, at approximately 2.20
p.m. (local time), on the eve of Yom Kippur, the holiest
day of the Jewish calendar, a Palestinian suicide bomber
from the West Bank town of Jenin perpetrated a
massacre in a crowded beachfront restaurant in the port
city of Haifa in northern Israel. The powerful explosion
ripped through the restaurant, killing 19 civilians
including three children and a baby girl, and wounding
60 others, dozens seriously.'
30
Such a letter would presumably have been useful to the ICJ, especially
since it describes the kind of activity that Israel claims the security
barrier is designed to prevent-a suicide bombing in Haifa, a city within
the Green Line, that Israel believes was carried out by a Palestinian from
Jenin, a refugee camp in the West Bank. In fact, Judge Buergenthal
decided not to sign on to the Court's dispotif precisely because "the
nature of these cross-Green Line attacks and their impact on Israel and its




130 Identical letters dated 8 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of
Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/58/424,
S/2003/972 (October 9, 2003).
131 Buergenthal Declaration, supra note 123, at 3.
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IV. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Notwithstanding the Court's exclusive reliance on the Secretary
General's dossiers despite their complete exclusion of readily available
evidence about Israel's security concerns, Richard Falk and others blame
Israel for the Court's failure to balance the harms caused by the security
barrier's construction with Israel's security needs. 32  Nothing more
could be expected of the ICJ, these commentators argue, because Israel
"forfeited the opportunity to present its security rationale" behind the
security barrier's construction.133 In his separate opinion, Judge
Kooijmans alludes to Israel's "obligation" to provide the Court with
evidence in its defense, noting that "Israel's argument that the Court does
not have at its disposal the necessary evidentiary material ... does not
hold water, as this obligation is to an important degree in the hands of
Israel as a party to the dispute."'134 Judge Kooijmans' choice of words is
a telling indicator of the real, as opposed to formal, procedural posture of
the case. First, he considers Israel to be "a party to the dispute" despite
the fact that there are no parties to advisory opinions. Second, he views
the production of evidentiary material in support of Israel's position as
being "in the hands of Israel"'' 35 rather than in the hands of the U.N.
Secretary General, whose function was to provide the Court with
background information to enable it to reach a decision. As was
discussed above, the Secretary General could easily have provided the
ICJ with evidence of Israel's security concerns, and the ICJ should have
questioned the Secretary General's failure to do so.
132 See Falk, supra note 44, at 47; see also, Ardi Imseis, Critical Reflections on
the International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion,
99 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 104 n.8 (2005) (expressly "not criticizing" the ICJ's
exclusive reliance on the Secretary General's dossier); lain Scobbie, Words My
Mother Never Taught Me-"In Defense of the International Court", 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 76, 79 (2005) (noting that "Israel, it should be recalled, had declined to
address" the merits of the case).
133 Falk, supra note 44, at 47.
134 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 43
I.L.M. at 1071, 28 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Kooijmans Opinion]; see
also Imseis, supra note 132, at 104 n.8 (quoting Judge Kooijmans' opinion
approvingly).
05 Kooijmans Opinion, supra note 134.
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Israel's refusal to address the merits of the case indirectly led the
Court to conclude that Israel could not invoke the self-defense provision
in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to justify construction of the barrier.'36
Without citing precedent, the Court held that Article 51 recognizes a
State's right of self-defense against armed attacks only if those attacks
"are imputable to a foreign State."' 37 Therefore, because "Israel does not
claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State," the
Court concluded that "Article 51 has no relevance in this case
' 38
Interestingly, the Court does not say that the attacks against Israel are in
fact not imputable to a foreign State, but merely that "Israel does not
claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State."'
' 39
When a court bases a legal conclusion on what a party does not
claim, the clear implication is that that party bore the burden of proof
with respect to that legal issue. The formal lack of an obligation to argue
the case on the merits is undermined by the defacto argue-or-lose choice
placed upon Israel by the ICJ's failure to conduct an independent
fact-finding inquiry. Here, had the Court cared to investigate, it might
have discovered that Israel does claim that the attacks against it are
imputable to a foreign state. Although the Court noted that many Israeli
Government documents about Israel's security problems are in the public
domain, 40 its conclusions about the inapplicability of Article 51 ignore
publicly available sources that provide detailed allegations of Israel's
claims regarding foreign involvement in Palestinian terrorism.'14  The
136 Others have also criticized the Court's conclusion regarding the
inapplicability of Article 51. Murphy, supra note 4, at 63-70; Wedgwood,
supra note 5, at 57, 61.
137 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 139.
138 id.
139 Id. (emphasis added).
140 Barrier Opinion, supra note 2, at 57; see also supra note 97.
141 E.g., ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IRAN AND SYRIA AS STRATEGIC
SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN TERRORISM (Sept. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/9/ (last visited
February 27, 2006) (detailed allegations of Iranian and Syrian support of
Palestinian terrorist groups); ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IRAQI
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Barrier Opinion has borne out the fears of the delegates to the San
Francisco Conference that the ICJ's advisory function would be used to
cast a nonconsenting state as a defacto defendant. 1
42
Richard Falk's praise of the Barrier Opinion seems to ignore his
own assertion that "the effort to cast a state in the role of de facto
defendant, without acquiring its genuine consent to the proceedings, is
hazardous for the Court['s] . . . growth as an institution.' ' 43 When the
right not to appear exists in name only, ICJ advisory opinions lose a
crucial aspect of "what makes a judgment finally acceptable,"
February 27, 2006) (detailed allegations of Iraqi support of Palestinian
terrorism); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: IRAN, supra note 126,
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm ("Iran backs Hizballah,
Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command-all groups violently opposed to the Arab-Israeli
peace process."); see also Douglas Frantz & James Risen, A Secret Iran-Arafat
Connection Is Seen Fueling the Mideast Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, at Al
("American and Israeli intelligence officials have concluded that Yasir Arafat
has forged a new alliance with Iran that involves Iranian shipments of heavy
weapons and millions of dollars to Palestinian groups that are waging guerrilla
war against Israel."); Susan Sachs, Islamic Jihad founder admits funding by
Iran, NEWSDAY (New York), Apr. 11, 1993, at p.14 ("In a late-night interview
with Newsday last week in his modem office in the Syrian capital, [Islamic]
Jihad founder Fathi Shikaki said Iranian money has been flowing regularly to
the group since the beginning of the Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule in
December, 1987.").
142 See POMERANCE, supra note 36, at 26 n.86 (discussing concerns voiced prior
to the San Francisco Conference of the need "to avoid a species of indirect
compulsory jurisdiction").
143 FALK, supra note 53, at 32 n.10. Falk dismisses the possibility that the
Barrier Opinion's conclusory analysis will adversely impact the credibility of
the ICJ. Instead, in analysis that is nearly as cursory as the Court's, he argues
that the Court's "virtual unanimity" should dispel any such concerns about a loss
of credibility, pointing to the "depth and breadth of this consensus" at least eight
times in his ten page article. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 44, at 43 ("[W]hat
constitutes a sufficiency of evidence is .. . a subjective judgment, but the
agreement of fourteen of fifteen judges . .. seems significant."); id. at 45
(Despite the suggestion that the ICJ should have exercised its discretion to
refuse to answer the request for an advisory opinion .... the virtual unanimity
of the Court ... gives great weight to the assertion that an advisory opinion on
these matters deserves to be treated with the greatest possible respect.").
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specifically, "the belief by the losing side that it unqualifiedly has had its
full day in court.' 144 Judge Kooijmans, Falk, and the Court itself should
not blame Israel for the Court's own failure to demand that the General
Assembly provide it with a balanced presentation of facts or,
alternatively, for the court's failure to appoint a special master to conduct
an independent investigation.
45
Much of the ICJ's failure to conduct a suitable factual
investigation stems in part from the flat institutional structure that
requires a single court to simultaneously investigate complex facts
while formulating standards with which to decide novel legal
questions. 1' Although the structure of the U.S. federal judiciary
serves as a useful comparison, 4 1 there are international tribunals
that are structured in a way that could be emulated by the ICJ. For
example, the ICJ could establish separate trial-level and appellate
panels, similar to the highly-regarded WTO dispute settlement
model, whose rate of compliance is exceptional. 148 In the near
term, a less drastic change would be to more regularly make use of
existing procedures to appoint an independent special master. 149
Had it done so in the Barrier Opinion, the Court might very well
have reached an identical conclusion about the security barrier's
legality. However, the likelihood of compliance would have been
'44 FALK, supra note 53, at 33.
145 See Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 53-54 (suggesting that the Court make use
of its ability to appoint a special master to conduct factual investigations).
146 See supra text accompanying note 48.
14 See supra Part III.
148 The compliance rate for WTO decisions is 80%, which is quite remarkable
for an international court. In fact, there is not a single WTO case in which a
small developing country could not induce compliance from a developed
country. The few cases of non-compliance involved disputes between large
countries, such as between Brazil and Canada. Unlike the ICJ, the WTO
jurisdiction is compulsory. Of course, it may be that part of the reason countries
are willing to submit to such jurisdiction is that the WTO Appellate Body is
perceived as credible and unbiased.
149 Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 53-54 (suggesting that the Court use its
authority to appoint a special master).
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greater, and "the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people
would have been better served" because "the Opinion would have
had the credibility it [currently] lacks."15
150 Buergenthal Declaration, supra note 123, 3, at 1078.
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